

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 SMS-02  
ACDA-12 DLOS-09 OES-09 /098 W  
-----036854 012204Z /66

R 012050Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5019  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
USDEL MC BRUSSELS  
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
USMISSION USNATO  
JCS WASHDC  
SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 18059

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PINT, MILI, NATO, UR, NO  
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SUBJECT: SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORWAY  
REF: (A) 77 MOSCOW 18499, (B) OSLO 778, (C) OSLO 3586,  
(D) STATE 187973, (E) HELSINKI 2406, (F) STATE 189520

1. EMBASSY HAS NO READY EXPLANATION FOR IMMEDIATE  
CAUSE OF RECENT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF NORWEGIAN  
TERRITORIAL WATERS AND LEAVES THE QUESTION TO THOSE

CLOSER TO THE SCENE (REFS C AND D). AN ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION AFFECTING TIMING OF SOVIET ACTIONS MAY BE THE CURRENT TENSION IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH PROVIDES AN INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO SEND SIGNALS THAT THEY CAN BRING PRESSURE ON THE ALLIANCE'S NORTHERN FLANK.

2. ON A LONGER TERM BASIS, EMBASSY FEELS THAT ANALYSIS IN REFS A AND B CONTINUES TO BE VALID AND THAT VIOLATIONS ARE PROBABLY TO BE SEEN AS PART OF A PATTERN OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORWAY. RECENTLY THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN MOST BLATANT IN KOSYGIN'S CALCULATED OUTBURST AGAINST NORWAY DURING THE FINNISH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS, BUT HAS BEEN CONSTANT OVER THE YEARS. IT REPRESENTS A SOVIET EFFORT TO INFLUENCE NORWEGIAN POLICY (PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS NATO) AND A SOVIET DETERMINATION TO EXTRACT FROM OSLO A GREATER RECOGNITION OF A SPECIAL STATUS FOR THE USSR IN THE NORDIC AREA.

3. AS FAR AS NATO IS CONCERNED, MOSCOW HAS SHOWN GREAT DISPLEASURE OVER THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM ADOPTED BY NATO AND PROBABLY FEELS THAT PRESSURE IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION. ALSO, MOSCOW CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED OVER THE PROSPECTS OF FRG INVOLVEMENT IN NATO ACTIVITIES IN  
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NORWAY (REF F) AND MAY CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO STRESS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THE ISSUE OF FRG INVOLVEMENT IN NORWEGIAN MILITARY AFFAIRS.

4. SIMILARLY, RECENT SOVIET FOOTDRAGGING ON THE QUESTION OF CATCHES IN THE SVALBARD FISHERIES PROTECTION ZONE INDICATES A CONTINUED DETERMINATION TO EXTRACT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS FROM NORWAY. SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE FISHERIES PROTECTION ZONE ISSUE STRIKES US AS CHARACTERISTIC OF MOSCOW'S POLICY TOWARD NORWAY IN WHICH THE SOVIETS ATTEMPT TO BROADEN BY INCREMENTS THEIR OWN RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AND AT THE SAME TIME TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE A NORWEGIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF MOSCOW'S SPECIAL INTEREST IN NORTHERN WATERS. WE ASSUME THAT THESE FACTORS UNDERLIE THE CALCULATIONS LEADING TO THE DECISION TO PROBE NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHATEVER MAY HAVE BEEN THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR MOVEMENT AT THIS TIME. AS WE SEE IT, MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE IN A VARIETY OF WAYS TO ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT NORWEGIAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ITS SPECIAL RIGHTS IN THE FAR NORTH AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY

DO SO IN A CHARACTERISTICALLY HEAVYHANDED MANNER.

5. IF TRUE, REF E, EMBASSY HELSINKI'S REPORT OF  
USTINOV'S REQUEST TO THE FINNS FOR JOINT MANEUVERS,  
STRIKES US AS PRESAGING A POTENTIALLY TENSE PERIOD  
OF SOVIET-NORDIC RELATIONS. (WESTERN DIPLOMATS HERE  
ASSERT THAT MOSCOW HAD MADE SUCH A REQUEST OO 'INLAND  
IN 1962 OR 1963.) IT SUGGESTS, MOREOVER, THAT SOVIET  
VIOLATIONS OF NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS MAY BE  
BUT PART OF A BROADER EFFORT, INITIATED BY KOSYGIN

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AT HELSINKI, TO OBTAIN GREATER NORDIC RECOGNITION AND ACCOMMODATION OF SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE AREA. WE ARE RELUCTANT TO DRAW DRAMATIC CONCLUSIONS AT THIS POINT, BUT THE COINCIDENCE OF PRESSURE ON NORWAY AND FINLAND SUGGESTS THAT MOSCOW MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE TIME IS RIPE FOR A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN BACKED UP BY A SHOW OF FORCE. THE GOALS OF THIS CAMPAIGN -- IN ADDITION TO SIGNALLING TO THE WEST SOVIET TROUBLEMAKING POTENTIAL -- WOULD BE TO ASSERT A GREATER VOICE IN NORDIC AFFAIRS, TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION OF SPECIAL SOVIET PRIVILEGES, AND TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO PROGRAMS WHICH COULD THREATEN THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE FAR NORTH.

6. MOSCOW'S PRIMARY CONCERN IN THE FAR NORTH, OF COURSE, IS WITH UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT IN AND OUT OF THE BARENTS SEA. THUS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE USSR FEARS STEPS ARE AFOOT TO INHIBIT THIS MOVEMENT AND FEELS THAT IT MUST TAKE STRONGER STEPS TO PROTECT ITS ABILITY TO EXIT AND ENTER THE BARENTS SEA. FYI. ONLY IN THIS RESPECT WE NOTE THAT DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF VICE CHAIRMAN OF U.S. LOS DELEGATION OXMAN, SOVIETS SHOWED CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY TO THE POTENTIAL LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED IRISH FORMULA FOR DEFINING THE OUTER LIMIT OF CONTINENTAL SHELF, A FORMULA WHICH WOULD BY SOVIET CALCULATIONS PERMIT WIDE-MARGIN COASTAL STATES TO EXTEND THEIR SHELLES TO THE MIDDLE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC. END FYI.

7. IT APPEARS THAT THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY HERE IS TAKING A RELAXED ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET VIOLATIONS. NORWEGIAN EMBASSY CHARGE WITH WHOM EMBOFF SPOKE

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JULY 28 SAID HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE INCIDENTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS. THE MFA SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES DEPARTMENT HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR SCANDINAVIAN DIPLOMATS JULY 26 BUT THE CHARGE SAID BOTH HE AND THE SOVIETS, INCLUDING DEPARTMENT CHIEF SOBOLEV,

AVOIDED THE SUBJECT IN VIEW OF THE PURELY SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE EVENT. (WE SUSPECT THE NORWEGIANS HERE ARE ALSO RESPONDING TO OSLO'S PREFERENCE FOR A LOW-KEY ATTITUDE PENDING A FULLER STUDY.) THE CHARGE INTERPRETED THE PRAVDA ARTICLE OF JULY 27 IMPLICITLY DENYING SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF NORWEGIAN WATERS AS A KIND OF "PRE-EMPTIVE" STRIKE LAYING A PUBLIC BASIS FOR REJECTING ANY FUTURE NORWEGIAN PROTEST AS MANEUVERS COOKED UP BY OSLO IN RESPONSE TO ARTIFICIALLY INSPIRED ANTI-SOVIETISM. THE CHARGE SAID HE HAS NO UNIQUE INSIGHTS ON THE INCIDENTS BUT ASSUMES THAT THEIR CONCENTRATION OVER A BRIEF PERIOD MEANS THEY ARE CALCULATED, JUST AS INCIDENTS INVOLVING ACCESS TO MOSCOW EMBASSIES HAVE SUCH MEANING WHEN THEY OCCUR TOGETHER. TOON

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## Message Attributes

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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
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**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** PINT, MILI, UR, NO, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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